One Action System or Two? Evidence for Common Central Preparatory Mechanisms in Voluntary and Stimulus-Driven Actions

Human behavior is comprised of an interaction between intentionally driven actions and reactions to changes in the environment. Existing data are equivocal concerning the question of whether these two action systems are independent, involve different brain regions, or overlap. To address this question we investigated whether the degree to which the voluntary action system is activated at the time of stimulus onset predicts reaction times to external stimuli.Werecorded event-related potentials while participants prepared and executed left- or right-hand voluntary actions, which were occasionally interrupted by a stimulus requiring either a left- or right-hand response. In trials where participants successfully performed the stimulus-driven response, increased voluntary motor preparation was associated with faster responses on congruent trials (where participants were preparing a voluntary action with the same hand that was then required by the target stimulus), and slower responses on incongruent trials. This suggests that early hand-specific activity in medial frontal cortex for voluntary action trials can be used by the stimulus-driven system to speed responding. This finding questions the clear distinction between voluntary and stimulus-driven action systems. © 2011 the authors

Temporal expectancies driven by self- and externally generated rhythms

The dynamic attending theory proposes that rhythms entrain periodic fluctuations of attention which modulate the gain of sensory input. However, temporal expectancies can also be driven by the mere passage of time (foreperiod effect). It is currently unknown how these two types of temporal expectancy relate to each other, i.e. whether they work in parallel and have distinguishable neural signatures. The current research addresses this issue. Participants either tapped a 1Hz rhythm (active task) or were passively presented with the same rhythm using tactile stimulators (passive task). Based on this rhythm an auditory target was then presented early, in synchrony, or late. Behavioural results were in line with the dynamic attending theory as RTs were faster for in- compared to out-of-synchrony targets. Electrophysiological results suggested self-generated and externally induced rhythms to entrain neural oscillations in the delta frequency band. Auditory ERPs showed evidence of two distinct temporal expectancy processes. Both tasks demonstrated a pattern which followed a linear foreperiod effect. In the active task, however, we also observed an ERP effect consistent with the dynamic attending theory. This study shows that temporal expectancies generated by a rhythm and expectancy generated by the mere passage of time can work in parallel and sheds light on how these mechanisms are implemented in the brain

How action structures time: About the perceived temporal order of action and predicted outcomes

Few ideas are as inexorable as the arrow of causation: causes must precede their effects. Explicit or implicit knowledge about this causal order permits humans and other animals to predict and control events in order to produce desired outcomes. The sense of agency is deeply linked with representation of causation, since it involves the experience of a self-capable of acting on the world. Since causes must precede effects, the perceived temporal order of our actions and subsequent events should be relevant to the sense of agency. The present study investigated whether the ability to predict the outcome of an action would impose the classical cause-precedes-outcome pattern on temporal order judgements. Participants indicated whether a visual stimulus (dots moving upward or downward) was presented either before or after voluntary actions of the left or right hand. Crucially, the dot motion could be either congruent or incongruent with an operant association between hand and motion direction learned in a previous learning phase. When the visual outcome of voluntary action was congruent with previous learning, the motion onset was more often perceived as occurring after the action, compared to when the outcome was incongruent. This suggests that the prediction of specific sensory outcomes restructures our perception of timing of action and sensory events, inducing the experience that congruent effects occur after participants' actions. Interestingly, this bias to perceive events according to the temporal order of cause and outcome disappeared when participants knew that motion directions were automatically generated by the computer. This suggests that the reorganisation of time perception imposed by associative learning depends on participants' causal beliefs

Adaptive behaviour and feedback processing integrate experience and instruction in reinforcement learning

In any non-deterministic environment, unexpected events can indicate true changes in the world (and require behavioural adaptation) or reflect chance occurrence (and must be discounted). Adaptive behaviour requires distinguishing these possibilities. We investigated how humans achieve this by integrating high-level information from instruction and experience. In a series of EEG experiments, instructions modulated the perceived informativeness of feedback: Participants performed a novel probabilistic reinforcement learning task, receiving instructions about reliability of feedback or volatility of the environment. Importantly, our designs de-confound informativeness from surprise, which typically co-vary. Behavioural results indicate that participants used instructions to adapt their behaviour faster to changes in the environment when instructions indicated that negative feedback was more informative, even if it was simultaneously less surprising. This study is the first to show that neural markers of feedback anticipation (stimulus-preceding negativity) and of feedback processing (feedback-related negativity; FRN) reflect informativeness of unexpected feedback. Meanwhile, changes in P3 amplitude indicated imminent adjustments in behaviour. Collectively, our findings provide new evidence that high-level information interacts with experience-driven learning in a flexible manner, enabling human learners to make informed decisions about whether to persevere or explore new options, a pivotal ability in our complex environment

Reward activates stimulus-specific and task-dependent representations in visual association cortices

Humans reliably learn which actions lead to rewards. One prominent question is how credit is assigned to environmental stimuli that are acted upon. Recent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have provided evidence that representations of rewarded stimuli are activated upon reward delivery, providing possible eligibility traces for credit assignment. Our study sought evidence of postreward activation in sensory cortices satisfying two conditions of instrumental learning: postreward activity should reflect the stimulus category that preceded reward (stimulus specificity), and should occur only if the stimulus was acted on to obtain reward (task dependency). Our experiment implemented two tasks in the fMRI scanner. The first was a perceptual decision-making task on degraded face and house stimuli. Stimulus specificity was evident as rewards activated the sensory cortices associated with face versus house perception more strongly after face versus house decisions, respectively, particularly in the fusiform face area. Stimulus specificity was further evident in a psychophysiological interaction analysis wherein face-sensitive areas correlated with nucleus accumbens activity after face-decision rewards, whereas house-sensitive areas correlated with nucleus accumbens activity after house-decision rewards. The second task required participants to make an instructed response. The criterion of task dependency was fulfilled as rewards after face versus house responses activated the respective association cortices to a larger degree when faces and houses were relevant to the performed task. Our study is the first to show that postreward sensory cortex activity meets these two key criteria of credit assignment, and does so independently from bottom-up perceptual processing

Confidence Predictions Affect Performance Confidence and Neural Preparation in Perceptual Decision Making

Decisions are usually accompanied by a feeling of being wrong or right – a subjective confidence estimate. But what information is this confidence estimate based on, and what is confidence used for? To answer these questions, research has largely focused on confidence regarding current or past decisions, for example identifying how characteristics of the stimulus affect confidence, how confidence can be used as an internally generated feedback signal, and how communicating confidence can affect group decisions. Here, we report two studies which implemented a novel metacognitive measure: predictions of confidence for future perceptual decisions. Using computational modeling of behaviour and EEG, we established that experience-based confidence predictions are one source of information that affects how confident we are in future decision-making, and that learned confidence-expectations affect neural preparation for future decisions. Results from both studies show that participants develop precise confidence predictions informed by past confidence experience. Notably, our results also show that confidence predictions affect performance confidence rated after a decision is made; this finding supports the proposal that confidence judgments are based on multiple sources of information, including expectations. We found strong support for this link in neural correlates of stimulus preparation and processing. EEG measures of preparatory neural activity (contingent negative variation; CNV) and evidence accumulation (centro-parietal positivity; CPP) show that predicted confidence affects neural preparation for stimulus processing, supporting the proposal that one purpose of confidence judgments may be to learn about performance for future encounters and prepare accordingly

Genomic Variation and Its Impact on Gene Expression in Drosophila melanogaster

Understanding the relationship between genetic and phenotypic variation is one of the great outstanding challenges in biology. To meet this challenge, comprehensive genomic variation maps of human as well as of model organism populations are required. Here, we present a nucleotide resolution catalog of single-nucleotide, multi-nucleotide, and structural variants in 39 Drosophila melanogaster Genetic Reference Panel inbred lines. Using an integrative, local assembly-based approach for variant discovery, we identify more than 3.6 million distinct variants, among which were more than 800,000 unique insertions, deletions (indels), and complex variants (1 to 6,000 bp). While the SNP density is higher near other variants, we find that variants themselves are not mutagenic, nor are regions with high variant density particularly mutation-prone. Rather, our data suggest that the elevated SNP density around variants is mainly due to population-level processes. We also provide insights into the regulatory architecture of gene expression variation in adult flies by mapping cis-expression quantitative trait loci (cis-eQTLs) for more than 2,000 genes. Indels comprise around 10% of all cis-eQTLs and show larger effects than SNP cis-eQTLs. In addition, we identified two-fold more gene associations in males as compared to females and found that most cis-eQTLs are sex-specific, revealing a partial decoupling of the genomic architecture between the sexes as well as the importance of genetic factors in mediating sex-biased gene expression. Finally, we performed RNA-seq-based allelic expression imbalance analyses in the offspring of crosses between sequenced lines, which revealed that the majority of strong cis-eQTLs can be validated in heterozygous individuals

Intentional Binding Is Driven by the Mere Presence of an Action and Not by Motor Prediction

Intentional binding refers to the fact that when a voluntary action produces a sensory outcome, action and outcome are perceived as being closer together in time. This phenomenon is often attributed, at least partially, to predictive motor mechanisms. However, previous studies failed to unequivocally attribute intentional binding to these mechanisms, since the contrasts that have been used to demonstrate intentional binding covered not only one but two processes: temporal control and motor identity prediction. In the present study we aimed to isolate the respective role of each of these processes in the emergence of intentional binding of action-effects. The results show that motor identity prediction does not modulate intentional binding of action-effects. Our findings cast doubts on the assumption that intentional binding of action effects is linked to internal forward predictive process

Action selection and action awareness

Human actions are often classified as either internally generated, or externally specified in response to environmental cues. These two modes of action selection have distinct neural bases, but few studies investigated how the mode of action selection affects the subjective experience of action. We measured the experience of action using the subjective compression of the interval between actions and their effects, known as ‘temporal binding’. Participants performed either a left or a right key press, either in response to a specific cue, or as they freely chose. Moreover, the time of each keypress could either be explicitly cued to occur in one of two designated time intervals, or participants freely chose in which interval to act. Each action was followed by a specific tone. Participants judged the time of their actions or the time of the tone. Temporal binding was found for both internally generated and for stimulus-based actions. However, the amount of binding depended on whether or not both the choice and the timing of action were selected in the same way. Stronger binding was observed when both action choice and action timing were internally generated or externally specified, compared to conditions where the two parameters were selected by different routes. Our result suggests that temporal action–effect binding depends on how actions are selected. Binding is strongest when actions result from a single mode of selection

The prediction of visual stimuli influences auditory loudness discrimination

The brain combines information from different senses to improve performance on perceptual tasks. For instance, auditory processing is enhanced by the mere fact that a visual input is processed simultaneously. However, the sensory processing of one modality is itself subject to diverse influences. Namely, perceptual processing depends on the degree to which a stimulus is predicted. The present study investigated the extent to which the influence of one processing pathway on another pathway depends on whether or not the stimulation in this pathway is predicted. We used an action–effect paradigm to vary the match between incoming and predicted visual stimulation. Participants triggered a bimodal stimulus composed of a Gabor and a tone. The Gabor was either congruent or incongruent compared to an action–effect association that participants learned in an acquisition phase.We tested the influence of action–effect congruency on the loudness perception of the tone. We observed that an incongruent–task-irrelevant Gabor stimulus increases participant’s sensitivity to loudness discrimination. An identical result was obtained for a second condition in which the visual stimulus was predicted by a cue instead of an action. Our results suggest that prediction error is a driving factor of the crossmodal interplay between vision and audition